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Abstract This paper aims at evaluating the extent to which the defence expendi-
ture of Greece and Cyprus given their arms race against Turkey in the
context of the Integrated Defence Doctrine policy constitutes a burden
feasible to bear. The evaluation takes place using an Optimal Control
solution constrained by a model emphasising on Greek and Cypriot de-
fence expenditure. Various experiments and scenarios have been tested
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2leading to the general conclusion that the defence expenditure in both
allied countries seems to be driving their economies beyond capacity
limits. This, however, by no means justifies the one sided disarmament
policy currently followed by Greece, since the long–term armament pro-
grammes pursued by Turkey, the role of which in this arms race has
been proven as leading, leave very small room to the Greek and Cypriot
sides to reduce their defence expenditures.
Keywords: Optimal Control, Defence Expenditure, Arms Race, Relative Military
Security
1. Introduction
Some people argue that the concurrent reduction in the defence pro-
grammes of Greece and Turkey during the recent past seems to raise
hopes that the Greek–Turkish arms race may not be an endless pro-
cedure after all. The extent to which this optimistic view is justified
depends on whether there is indeed a causal relationship between the
unexpected Greek defence programme reduction, shortly after it had
been approved in the country’s parliament by an overwhelming major-
ity, and that of Turkey, after the latest economic crisis. The aim of this
paper, however, is not to answer this question since we do not know of
any causality tests applicable to qualitative foreign policy issues. What
we have decided to do, instead, is to consider the extent to which this
arms race constitutes an excessive defence burden for Greece and Cyprus,
especially after the implementation of the Integrated Defence Doctrine.
We shall attempt to calculate, in addition, the optimal defence burden
for the two members of this alliance under the constraints imposed by
their economies. Finally, we shall consider the extent to which pursuing
such optimal recipes leads indeed to collecting a substantial peace div-
idend, in the sense proposed by several sources in the literature. The
answers will be provided in the context of an Optimal Control solution,
using an Interior Penalty Function Method, with Steepest Descent and
Armijo Line Search, as it is explained in section 3, after a brief litera-
ture overview has been provided in section 2. The fourth part of this
paper includes the description of the econometric model used by the
algorithm as a constraints structure under which the penalty function
is minimised. Section 5 includes various policy considerations based on
the results derived by the algorithm, while the conclusions derived are
stated in the last part of this paper.
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2. Literature Overview
The existence of an arms race between Greece and Turkey is a well
established fact (Kollias and Makrydakis 1997), determined chiefly by
demographic factors describing the Turkish rather than the Greek eco-
nomic and demographic environment (Andreou and Zombanakis 2000).
The extent to which mutual reduction of defence expenditure would lead
to a substantial peace dividend has been extensively analysed for both
the Greek–Turkish case (Balfoussias and Stavrinos 1996, Ozmucur 1996,
Kollias 1997), as well in a more general context referring to the cost in
terms of growth (Deger 1986, Ward et al. 1991, Buck et al. 1993, Looney
1994 and several authors in Hartley and Sandler 1990). In fact, the cost
of an arms race, especially on the foreign sector of what is commonly
termed a “small, open economy” is rather expensive since military expen-
diture, is highly import–demanding, leading to foreign borrowing which
exerts an adverse impact on both the domestic and the foreign sector (
Stavrinos and Zombanakis 1998). Especially after the full implementa-
tion of the Integrated Defence Doctrine between Greece and Cyprus, the
GDP shares of military expenditure by the two allies have exceeded 6%
in certain cases, while the military debt has doubled within the decade
of the 1990s to reach more than 5 billion dollars at the end of 2000,
representing about 16% of the total General Government external debt
of the country, according to provisional Bank of Greece data. Kollias
(Kollias 1994, Kollias 1995 and Kollias 1996) and Antonakis (Anton-
akis 1996 and Antonakis 1997) have investigated the economic effects of
defence expenditure upon the Greek economy.
It is obvious, therefore, that the defence expenditure constitutes a
considerable burden for the economies of Greece and Cyprus, meaning
that the next straightforward question would be to consider what the
ideal defence burden would be. To this end, we have decided to resort
to using optimal control analysis in order to specify the optimal defence
expenditure levels of the two allies, a Nash equilibrium problem analysed
in the context of the theory of alliances in its simplest form (Hartley and
Sandler 1995).
3. The Algorithms
The technique we employ for solving the Optimal Control problem, is
an Interior Penalty Function Method, with Steepest Descent and Armijo
Line Search. This has been used for the minimization phase as follows:
Φ(x, rk) = f(x)− rk
mX
j=1
1
gj(x)
, (1)
4where f(x) is the sum of squared differences between the variables and
their corresponding target values (i.e. the original objective function),
gj(x), j = 1, ...,m, are the constraints of the proposed model, and rk is
the penalty parameter. The repeated application of an unconstrained
minimization technique to the function Φ(x, rk), for a decremental se-
quence of values of the penalty parameter rk, leads to convergence of
the corresponding solutions to the solution of the original (constrained)
problem, with feasibility standing for each one of the intermediate solu-
tions.
For the unconstrained minimization phase of the algorithm, we em-
ploy a widely used method, namely the Steepest Descent technique with
Armijo Line Search, allowing the solution an accuracy of 10−3 and a
maximum number of 500 Armijo iterations. This maximum number of
iterations proved to be enough for obtaining the solution in almost all
experiments. In certain cases, however, in which the solution could not
be detected after these iterations, re–initialisation to a different feasible
starting point was considered as an alternative.
Concerning the Penalty Function, the initial feasible point x0 and the
initial value of the penalty term, r0 = 10, are the main parameters. Con-
cerning the Armijo Line Search, several parameters have to be defined.
The version of the Armijo Line Search that has been used to solve the
Optimal Control problem, differs from the standard Armijo Line Search
and it is applicable to any descent direction φk. This version is proposed
and studied in (Polak 1997 and Vrahatis et al. 2000) and can be imple-
mented in two versions depending on the input value of a parameter s.
The procedure uses two parameters α, β ∈ (0, 1), defined by the user.
Furthermore, the values for the maximum number of Armijo iterations
required, MIT = 500, the desired accuracy, ε = 10−3, and a parameter
m∗ ∈ Z, complete the input parameters set of the algorithm, which is
exhibited in pseudocode in Table 1.1.
The selection s = 0 is normally used with Newton–like algorithms,
with m∗ = 0 to ensure superlinear convergence. The selection s = 0 is
not very good for first–order algorithms because, on average, it requires
considerably more function evaluations than the selection s = 1. So,
s = 1 is used in first–order algorithms.
If the objective function Φ is bounded from below the subprocedure
in Table 1.2 is used to find an mk satisfying Relations (b) and (c) of
Step 5 of the algorithm. This subprocedure uses the last used step
length λk−1 = βmk−1 as the starting point for the computation of the
next step (Polak 1997).
The validity of the results obtained has been double–checked using
a modification of the Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) method for
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Table 1.1. The Interior Penalty Function Method, with Steepest Descent and Armijo
Line Search.
Step 1 Start with an initial feasible point x0, i.e. a point that satisfies all the
constraints of the objective function Φ(x, rk) of Eq. 1, and an initial
value of the penalty term, r0 > 0. Set a counter n = 0.
Step 2 Set the values for the Armijo Line Search:
MIT ; α, β ∈ (0, 1); s ∈ {0, 1}; m∗ ∈ Z, and ε.
Comment: Start of the minimization phase.
Step 3 Set k = 0.
Step 4 If ||∇Φ(xk, rk)|| 6 ε go to Step 8; Else compute a descent direction φk.
Step 5 If s = 0, set M∗ = {m ∈ Z | m > m∗}, and compute the stepsize
(a) λk = βmk = argmaxm∈M∗{βm | Φ(xk + βmφk, rk)− Φ(xk, rk) 6
6 βmα〈∇Φ(xk, rk), φk〉} ;
Else (s = 1) compute the stepsize λk = βmk , where mk ∈ Z is any
integer such that
(b) Φ(xk + βmkφk, rk)− Φ(xk, rk) 6 βmkα〈∇Φ(xk, rk), φk〉 and
(c) Φ(xk + βmk−1φk, rk)− Φ(xk, rk) > βmk−1α〈∇Φ(xk, rk), φk〉.
Step 6 Set xk+1 = xk + λkφk.
Step 7 If k < MIT, replace k by k + 1, and go to Step 4; Else go to Step 8.
Step 8 Store xk as x∗ and go to the next step.
Comment: End of the minimization phase.
Step 9 Test whether x∗ is the optimum solution of the original problem.
If x∗ is found to be optimum, terminate the process.
Else go to the next step.
Step 10 Set rn+1 = c rn, where c < 1.
Step 11 Set n = n+ 1, take the new starting point as x0 = x∗ and go to
Step 3.
locating all the global minima of an objective function (Parsopoulos and
Vrahatis 2001). This involves setting a threshold, beyond which particles
of the population bearing lower function values are isolated. Following
that, “Stretching” (Parsopoulos et al. 2001) or “Deflation” is performed
6Table 1.2. The Stepsize Subprocedure
1. If k = 0, set m′ = m∗; Else set m′ = mk−1.
2. If mk = m′ satisfies Relations (b) and (c) of Step 5 of the algorithm, stop.
3. If mk = m′ satisfies (b) but not (c), replace m′ by m′ − 1, and go to Step 2.
If mk = m′ satisfies (c) but not (b), replace m′ by m′ + 1, and go to Step 2.
at this point in order to repel the rest of the swarm (population) from
moving toward it. Finally, a local search is performed in its neighbor-
hood, thus detecting a local minimum. Applied to the function Φ(x, rk),
the modified PSO resulted in several local minima of the objective func-
tion as well as the global one, which has been compared to the one
obtained by the Steepest Descent algorithm. The main aspects of this
algorithm are shown in Table 1.3.
Table 1.3. The Particle Swarm Optimizer for locating all the Global Minima
Step 1 Set a threshold ε > 0 and the number of desired minima, N .
Step 2 Initialize randomly the population, velocities and the parameters of
PSO. Let L = ∅ be the set of found minima. Set the value of the
maximum number of iterations, MIT, and a counter IT = 0.
Step 3 While (card(L) 6= N) and (IT < MIT ) Do
Step 4 Set IT = IT+ 1 and update PSO’s inertia weight. Find the best
particle of the swarm, xbest.
Step 6 If Φ(xbest, r) 6 ε, isolate xbest and perform constrained local search
around it. Add the solution found by the local search at the set L
and add a new, randomly chosen, particle into the swarm. Apply
Deflation or Stretching at the point xbest (see formulas below).
Step 7 End While
Step 8 Print all elements of the set L and other parameters.
According to the “Deflation” technique, a new function Φ(x,r)||x−xbest|| is
substituted for the the original objective function Φ(x, r), where xbest is
an isolated particle of the swarm. “Stretching” is a recently proposed
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technique (Parsopoulos et al. 2001) and it is consisted of a two–stages
transformation of the original objective function. Thus, instead of min-
imising the function Φ(x, r), another function, H(x, r), which is given
by the formulas below, is minimised:
G(x, r)=Φ(x, r) +
γ1
2
‖x− xbest‖

sign(Φ(x, r)− Φ(xbest, r)) + 1

,
H(x, r)=G(x, r) +
γ2
2
sign

Φ(x, r)− Φ(xbest, r))

+ 1
tanh

µ(G(x, r)−G(xbest, r))
 ,
where γ1 = 104, γ2 = 1, and µ = 10−10.
4. The Model
The constraint structure we use for the optimisation procedure is
a small, highly aggregated model of seven equations representing the
economies of Greece and Cyprus. The model is based on previous re-
search on the topic (Stavrinos and Zombanakis 1998), placing emphasis
on the defence expenditure side, while variables expressing the Turkish
side are taken as exogenous. The majority of the variables are expressed
in terms of GDP percentages aiming at concentrating on the growth
effects of the priorities assigned to defence policy. Such effects became
more pronounced in cases like the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974
and the Greek–Turkish crises in 1982 and 1987. As a first step, all the
variables in the stochastic equations have been expressed in natural logs
and tested for integration.
The demand for defence expenditure for each of the two allies is rep-
resented as follows:
GDEFCRS= f(GGDPCS,GNDEFCRS,GBOP,DRDL,RS,TDEFCRS), (2)
CDEFCRS= f(CGDPCS,CNDEFCRS,CBOP,USDCP,RS,TDEFCRS), (3)
where GDEFCRS and CDEFCRS are the corresponding GDP shares of
defence expenditure for the two allies. Military expenditure is usually
reported in current prices in local currency terms. For most purposes
of economic analysis, however, it is the share of military expenditure to
GDP – the military burden – that is of most interest because it reflects
the relative priority given by the state to military demands and because
it measures the relative burden or resource costs1. Its calculation does
not depend on the choice of a specific price index, since it is the ratio of
two measures in current domestic currency. It is a pure number that can
be compared over time and across countries and it is by now extensively
used in empirical investigations. There is, however, caution expressed
in the literature in that measuring the military spending and the other
8variables in the model as shares or proportions of GDP, can be mislead-
ing and may introduce biases in the measurement of certain coefficients
(Chan 1985). GGDPCS and CGDPCS is the Greek and Cypriot GDP
at constant prices respectively, GNDEFCRS and CNDEFCRS represent
the share of non–defence expenditure for the two countries, GBOP and
CBOP represent the Greek and Cypriot balance–of–payments deficits,
while DRDL and USDCP stand for the two countries respective cur-
rency rates against the US dollar. Notice that the price variable is not
included in these functions, due to the lack of import substitution in the
two countries, a problem which renders the demand for defence equip-
ment almost completely price inelastic. The threat variable in both cases
is TDEFCRS , which represents the Turkish GDP share of defence ex-
penditure. Finally, special attention should be drawn to the spillover
variable: One might be tempted to argue that a suitable spillover vari-
able would be the military burden of the NATO countries except Greece
and Turkey. We feel, however, that since our aim is to concentrate on
the Greek–Cypriot alliance as this is expressed through the Integrated
Defence Doctrine, what is required is an alternative measure tailored to
fit this particular case. We have chosen, therefore to use a measure of
relative security as a result of the two countries’ alliance. This is appli-
cable to cases in which the role of the substantial difference in human
resources endowments between the two sides involved in an arms race is
decisive (Andreou and Zombanakis 2001). The measure of this relative
security coefficient is given by:
RS = exp(x), (4)
where x stands for the ratio of the difference between the Greek and
Cypriot population rates of change over the corresponding Turkish fig-
ure, as follows:
x =
p˙G − p˙C
p˙T
. (5)
On the basis of Eqs. 4 and 5 one may be tempted to argue that the ideal
alliance target for a balance between the two sides concerning security
would be a value of RS = 2.718, once x assumes the value of unity. Un-
der the circumstances, however, this is a prohibitive restriction, meaning
that the applied side of the matter calls for a more realistic constraint.
It must be borne in mind, however, that this relative security coefficient
composed of the population characteristics of the two sides involved in an
arms race includes a bit more than what meets the eye: In fact, the role
of the population rates of increase in the RS is not only associated with
the increased manpower in the armed forces, a development which finds
itself, anyway, in direct conflict with the concept of modern warfare. It
is also linked with the continuous and pressing demands of Turkey for
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increase of its vital space justified by the population explosion in the
country.
The GDP in the two countries is taken to be determined by a be-
havioural equation given that emphasis has been placed on the devel-
opments of the GDP as this is affected by a number of variables which
are leading determinants of the demand for defence expenditure. Eqs. 6
and 7 describe growth in the two allied countries in terms of its main
ingredients: accumulation of physical capital GTIS and CTIS , non–
defence expenditure, net imports of goods and services as an indication
of the external constraint imposed on the growth rate of the economy.
Finally, the drachma exchange rate is included given that it has been
a very popular policy instrument for the period under study. Thus the
GDP in both countries is taken as determined as follows:
GGDPCS= f(GNDEFCRS,GTIS,GBOP,DRDL), (6)
CGDPCS= f(CNDEFCRS,CTIS,GBOP,USDCP), (7)
where GTIS and CTIS stand for the GDP shares of total investment
expenditure in Greece and Cyprus. It must be borne in mind that given
the trade–off between non–defence and defence expenditure, the latter
can be thought of as implicitly introduced in these functions to account
for the direct effects of military spending on growth in the form of spin–
offs, be it favourable or adverse (Hartley and Sandler 1995)2.
Since special attention has been awarded to the role of human re-
sources in the arms race between the two sides, we have chosen to devote
a behavioural equation to describe population developments in each of
the two allies3. Thus, the Greek and Cypriot populations are taken to
behave as follows:
GPOP= f(GGDPCS,GDEFCRS,GNDEFCRS,GCPIDR), (8)
CPOP= f(CGDPCS,CDEFCRS,CNDEFCRS,CCPICP), (9)
where GCPIDR and CCPICP are the Greek and Cypriot consumer price
indices.
Eqs. 2 to 9 including the identity describing the relative security mea-
sure for the two allies make up the constraint structure under which the
optimisation exercise will be undertaken.
All series have been found to be I(1), that is, stationary in their first
differences, on the basis of the ADF test, while the estimation period
undertaken ranges between 1960 and 2000. The short–run estimates
listed below compose an error–correction model, with all coefficients
bearing the expected signs and being significant to a 1% or 5% level
while the explanatory power of all six equations is satisfactory. Due to
the length of the estimation period a small number of dummy variables
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has been used to tackle the effects of important exogenous disturbances,
usually of political or social nature, introducing structural changes in the
economy. All variables are expressed in terms of first differences and the
RES terms indicating the residual item of the corresponding long–run
version of each equation:
GGDPCS=0.022 + 0.100 log(GNDEFCRS(−1)) + 0.235 log(GTIS)−
− 0.056 log(GBOP(−4))− 0.062 log(DRDL) +
+ 0.476 log(GGDPCS(−1))− 0.048RES(−1)−
− 0.047DGGDP+ 0.048DDIC, (10)
GDEFCRS=− 0.029− 4.872 log(GNDEFCRS) + 0.354 log(GGDPCS(-2)) +
+ 0.547 log(DRDL)− 0.295 log(GBOP(−1))−
− 0.010 log(RS(−1)) + 0.112 log(TDEFCRS)−
− 0.147RES(−1) + 0.086DGDEF, (11)
GPOP=0.001 + 0.026 log(GGDPPC) + 0.012 log(GNDEFCRS)−
− 0.0003 log(GCPIDR(−2))− 0.005 log(GDEFCRS(−3))−
− 0.113RES(−1) + 0.635 log(GPOP(−1)) + 0.006DGDEMO, (12)
CGDPCS=0.052 + 0.227 log(CNDEFCRS)− 0.515 log(CBOP) +
+ 0.250 log(USDCP)− 0.164RES(−1) + 0.130DCGDP, (13)
CDEFCRS=0.024− 16.595 log(CNDEFCRS) + 0.372 log(CGDPCS(−3))−
− 0.455 log(USDCP)− 0.367 log(CBOP(−1))−
− 0.014 log(RS(−2)) + 0.418 log(TDEFCRS)−
− 0.704RES(−1) + 0.210DCDEF, (14)
CPOP=− 0.004 + 0.065 log(CGDPPC(−2)) + 0.055 log(CNDEFCRS(−4))−
− 0.016 log(CCPICP)− 0.382RES(−1) + 0.031DCINV+
+ 0.004TIME− 0.118DCDEMO, (15)
RS=exp
 
log(GPOP)− log(GPOP(−1))

−

log(CPOP)−
− log(CPOP(−1))
 ﬃ 
log(TPOP)− log(TPOP(−1))
!
. (16)
The description of the historical data on the basis of the model seems
to be quite satisfactory following a dynamic simulation. Given this set
of equations as a constraint structure, the optimization problem is for-
mulated by requiring the minimization of the squared deviations of the
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endogenous variables from their respective targets as these are set in
the context of a number of scenarios. The policy instruments used are
the GDP shares of defence expenditure in the two allied countries, while
all targets have been assigned equal weights. Despite the fact that the
importance assigned to each of these endogenous variables may differ
depending on each policy–maker’s hierarchy ordering and priorities, we
have decided to assign equal weights to all seven of them aiming at deal-
ing with the optimal control problem in its most generalized version.
While the equations above have been estimated for the period between
1960 and 2000, the optimization exercise concentrates on the last eleven
years, namely 1990 to 2000, in order to avoid the adverse repercussions
of a large number of structural reforms, both economic and political,
affecting Greece and Cyprus during the previous three decades.
5. Policy Considerations
The analysis which follows is based on prior work on this issue (An-
dreou and Zombanakis 2000) which points out that the importance of
human resources in the arms race between Greece and Turkey must
be acknowledged. This means that there are three possible strategies
which may be followed concerning the emphasis placed on resources:
Two strategies emphasising on just human or property resources alone
and a third one, using both property and human resources simultane-
ously. Emphasis on human resources is described by setting the Greek
population rate to increase by about 1.5% to 2%, and the corresponding
Cypriot figure to remain close to zero. This difference in the population
growth rates of the two allies will thus be equal to the Turkish population
growth rate, keeping the two conflicting sides in a balance according to
the relative security criterion RS, a very ambitious target indeed! Em-
phasis on property resources, in its turn is expressed by setting the GDP
growth rates of the two allies to 5%. All three strategies must then be
compared to a neutral, “reference” strategy in the sense that it does not
stress the importance of either property or human resources. Each of
these strategies, in its turn, involves four possible scenarios as it is usu-
ally the case in a typical arms race examined via game theory, or in the
context of the “prisoner’s dilemma”. We assign, therefore, increasing or
decreasing future values to the GDP shares of defence expenditure of
Greece and Cyprus on one hand and Turkey on another4, thus referring
to the following four scenarios, with the terms “reduction” and “escala-
tion” suggesting a respective decrease or increase of the GDP share of
defence expenditure of the country or countries involved: 1 (Both sides
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escalate), 2 (Greece and Cyprus escalate and Turkey reduces), 3 (Turkey
escalates and Greece and Cyprus reduce) and 4 (Both sides reduce).
5.1. Arms Race: Both Sides Escalate
(Scenario 1)
It seems that for the decade under consideration, the average optimal
Greek and Cypriot GDP share of defence expenditure in the context of
the arms race between Greece and Turkey stands to about 3.5%. This
is a very reasonable figure to a large extent comparable with the corre-
sponding figures of most EU and NATO members. The fact remains,
however, that this figure for the two allies reaches as high as 6.0% to
6.5% in certain cases, depending on the time profile of their armament
programmes. It is interesting to point out, however, that the optimal
defence expenditure figure as a percentage of GDP is remarkably sta-
ble on the average at about 3.4% to 3.6% for both allies, irrespective
of strategies chosen. However, the average alliance relative security, as
this is measured by RS, for the period under consideration obtains its
highest optimal value when preponderance of human resources alone is
assumed. This means that maximising the GDP share of defence expen-
diture alone, by itself, is not the only recipe to security maximisation,
especially in the case of the Greek–Turkish arms race, in which the role
of human resources is leading.
The deviations of the optimal values derived by the algorithm from
their respective actual observations are a further interesting point to ob-
serve, aiming at pointing out the resources devoted to defence over and
above what the constrained optimisation procedure indicates: These de-
viations may be regarded, in other words, as the cost suffered as a result
of the arms race in which Greece and Cyprus are involved against Turkey.
The first point to make concerns the main issue, which is the GDP shares
of defence expenditure for the two allies. It seems that the Greek econ-
omy exceeds the optimal defence burden by about 25% on the average
irrespective of the strategy followed. The excess defence expenditure
with respect to the suggested optimal in the Greek case reaches close to
30% on the average for the period under review, when emphasis is placed
on property resources. This is to a large extent, expected since it reflects
the high cost of transforming the defence mechanism from a manpower–
intensive complex to a defence mechanism focusing on small–numbered
efficient forces armed with very expensive modern equipment, given the
constraint imposed by the Greek economy. On the contrary, average de-
fence overspending is slightly higher than 10% in the case of Cyprus, for
all strategies involved, indicating that the Cypriot GDP share of defence
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spending is close to its optimal level. The extent to which this is a policy
option or, instead, a result of a supply constraint remains to be seen as a
matter of further research. It is important to concentrate, finally on the
security level as this is measured by RS and attained by employing var-
ious strategies, in the context of the arms race scenario: To begin with,
it seems that in all cases and as a result of defence overspending, the
average actual security performance considerably exceeds the optimal.
This finding also suggests that in the context of the ongoing arms race,
the optimal security level required for the alliance leaves a great deal to
be desired if emphasis were placed on property, rather than human re-
sources. In fact, given the heavy structural reform cost of transforming
the forces of the alliance into efficient, small–scale, well–equipped units
on one hand, and the constraint of the alliance economies on the other,
the average optimal security performance of the alliance deviates from
the corresponding actual figure considerably. This deviation may be
considerably restricted if the strategy concentrates on human resources,
which, however, happens to be the strong point of the Turkish side (
Andreou and Zombanakis 2001). Bearing, therefore, these considera-
tions in mind, we feel that property resources must be awarded special
attention despite the cost involved, simply because Greece and Cyprus
are expected to suffer a considerable disadvantage in the field of human
resources in the long run.
5.2. Offensive Alliance Tactics: Greece and
Cyprus Escalate while Turkey Reduces
(Scenario 2)
This scenario assumes offensive tactics from the part of the alliance,
this driving the relative security factor RS to considerably higher levels
compared to the arms–race scenario previously analysed, particularly if
emphasis is placed on property resources, while the average optimal GDP
share of defence expenditure barely exceeds 3.5% for both allies. It is
most interesting to observe with reference to the policy considerations,
as these are derived on the basis of the “reference” strategy, that the
optimal values derived for both the relative security factor and the GDP
shares of defence expenditure for the two allies are identical to those
derived according to the fourth scenario of mutual disarmament by both
the allies and Turkey which we shall consider below. This means that
the reduction of defence expenditure by the Turkish side is the decisive
element that affects the decision of the allied side concerning its military
spending and, consequently, the performance of the model in terms of
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optimal values. On the contrary, the extent to which the Allies will move
to disarmament policies or not plays no role whatsoever.
In cases of offensive tactics from the part of the alliance while, in
parallel Turkey reduces its defence expenditure, the average optimal
deviations from their corresponding actual for Greece are all of the or-
der between 26% and 28%, indicating no substantial difference between
strategies in the case of Greece while the corresponding Cypriot figures
range between 12% and 17%. Turning, finally, to the relative security
measure, and given the reducing policy of the Turkish side, the optimal
relative security measure when preponderance is awarded to property re-
sources is considerably close to the actual level attained by the alliance,
a result more or less expected as shifting to property rather than human
resources seems to be part of the modern warfare strategy in view of the
considerable decline in the Greek population rate, a feature of a large
number of modern advanced economies. Attaining this specific target by
placing emphasis on property resources is facilitated by the concurrent
defence–reducing policy from the part of Turkey.
5.3. Defensive Alliance Tactics: Greece and
Cyprus Reduce while Turkey Escalates
(Scenario 3)
As it is expected, the relative security factor is lower in this case
compared to the scenario previously analysed, as a result of the defence
expenditure reduction from the part of the alliance in parallel to the
offensive Turkish tactics. The average GDP shares of defence expendi-
ture which are suggested as optimal, however, are remarkably fixed to
about 3.5% for both allies, with maximum figures not exceeding 6.5%
for Greece and about 6.0% for Cyprus. This simply means that as long
as Turkey follows offensive defence policies, the two allies do not have
any room for defence expenditures reduction. It seems, indeed, that the
mobilisation of both categories of resources still does not seem to con-
tribute to better defence performance, this meaning that the economies
are already close to their optimal defence expenditure levels.
The outstanding role of Turkey in its arms race against Greece and
Cyprus is shown very clearly in the context of this scenario, as it has been
the case in scenario 2: Indeed, resorting once more to the “reference”
strategy which reflects reality clearer than any of the others, since it is
relieved of any form of emphasis on either resource category, one can
observe that the optimal values suggested for the GDP shares of defence
expenditure of both allies, as well as for the relative security factor RS
are identical to those derived in the case of the first scenario, according
Searching for the Optimal Defence Expenditure 15
to which both sides escalate. It is evident, therefore, once again that the
role of Turkey in the arms race against Greece and Cyprus is to dictate
the intensity of this race, leaving the opposite side no room to mitigate
this influence.
Concerning deviations between actual and optimal values, the esca-
lation of the Turkish defence activity accompanied by reducing tactics
from the part of the alliance seems to lead to attaining optimal Greek de-
fence expenditure figures which are inferior to the corresponding actual
by about 23% to 27% on the average. The lowest deviation is observed in
cases in which no particular emphasis is placed on either human or prop-
erty resources, an outcome that seems natural considering the context of
this scenario. The corresponding Cypriot figures, however, appear quite
low, lower than 10% in certain cases, indicating that the GDP defence
expenditure is possibly close to what the economy can take. As a result
of the policy followed by the two allies, the superiority of the use of
property resources is obvious in this case as well, in which the optimal
value attained falls short with respect to the actual RS by only 23%
against 40% to 50% of the remaining strategies tested.
5.4. Mutual Disarmament Agreement: Both
Sides Reduce
(Scenario 4)
No matter how unrealistic this scenario appears, one must consider
it for the sake of a complete analysis. It seems natural that diverting
resources away from defence expenditure to alternative, non–defence ac-
tivities reduces the optimal values suggested by the algorithm for certain
observations, even if the average optimal GDP shares of defence expen-
diture remain close to 3.5% for both allies. In fact, this is the only
scenario examined thus far in which placing emphasis on both property
and human resources allows the Greek economy to restrict the maximum
annual defence burden up to 5.5% instead of 6.5% which has been the
case thus far. This should be regarded as a blessing given the absence
of a Turkish threat, since it suggests that the economy is allowed to
pursue its defence programme, with fewer resources devoted to it, as it
is stated by assumption. This, of course, allows for a considerable peace
dividend for the Greek economy. Unfortunately, this does not seem to
be the case for Cyprus which, even in this case, it is compelled to de-
vote to defence spending shares as high as 6.0% of its GDP. It is finally
comforting to observe that, in an environment of mutual disarmament
policies from the part of Greece and Cyprus on one hand and Turkey on
the other, the relative security factor between the two allies can reach
16
rather high values on certain occasions, particularly if property resources
are mobilised.
From the point of view of deviations between actual and optimal val-
ues, the mutual reduction scenario appears to be the least costly, for the
Greek side at least, when emphasis is placed on human resources, in the
case of which the optimal value of the GDP share of defence expenditure
is by about 22% lower than the corresponding actual. This being the
least demanding scenario, since it involves mutual disarmament policies
from both the allies and Turkey, does not require expensive, property–
resource tactics to face an arms race. It is considered, therefore, reason-
able that it points towards human resources as the least costly solution.
Cyprus, on the other hand, seems to be indifferent in this case, between
shifting to property or human resources, with the corresponding average
deviations being of the order of about 11%. Despite this “preference” to-
wards human resources in the context of a mutual disarmament scenario,
it appears that the relative security is best attained when emphasis is
given to property resources, an expensive but efficient and competitive
strategy.
6. Conclusions
The analysis presented thus far leads to the following interesting con-
clusions:
1 Both the Greek and the Cypriot economies are compelled to de-
vote a substantial percentage of their GDP to defence expenditure,
about twice as high as the corresponding GDP share in most EU
or NATO countries, in the context of all scenaria and strategies
tested. This excessive spending measures the cost suffered by the
alliance members due to the Greek–Turkish arms race and may be
taken to approximate the peace dividend involved. An immediate
consequence of excessive defence expenditure, is that the relative
security coefficient describing the alliance security status versus
Turkey is much higher compared to its optimal values.
2 The optimal values proposed by the algorithm are exclusively de-
termined by the policy followed by Turkey, irrespective of the re-
action from the part of Greece and Cyprus, a finding that confirms
the leading role of Turkey in this arms race and supports the con-
clusions of earlier work on this issue.
3 Placing emphasis on property resources seems to yield optimal val-
ues which are closer to the actual ones. This finding leads to the
conclusion that preponderance of property resources over human
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resources, a feature of modern warfare philosophy, may be justi-
fied given that it yields optimal values which are, in most cases,
closer to those actually attained, indicating an expensive, however
desirable policy, to the extent that the high actual GDP shares of
defence expenditure are considered necessary.
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Notes
1. See (Goertz and Diehl 1986), and (Herrera 1994), for the comparison of different
approaches in measuring military allocations.
2. General surveys of the effects of military expenditure on growth and development
are given in (Renner 1992; Isard and Anderton 1992; Pivetti 1992; Mintz and Stevenson
1995; Ward et al. 1995) among others. For comprehensive bibliographies in English see (
Klein et al. 1995, and Hartley and Hooper 1990).
3. For a very useful review on the subject we resorted to (Ehrlich and Lui 1997).
4. The choice of the defence expenditure as a share of the GDP rather than the level of
the military expenditure itself is widely used in the literature and aims at introducing, to a
certain extent at least, the question of sustainability of the defence burden by relating it to
the total output of an economy.
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